أ.م.د. عابد خالد رسول: أستاذ مساعد في قسم العلوم السياسية – كلية العلوم السياسية – جامعة السليمانية    [email protected]

م.عبدالله قادر فقی ابراهیم: طالب دكتورا في كلية العلوم السياسية – جامعة السليمانية و ومدرس في كلية القانون/ الجامعة راپەرین [email protected]

الكلمات المفتاحية: الفدرالية المالية، مسؤوليات الإنفاق، توزيع السلطات، العلاقات المالية بين الحكومية، المساواة والكفاءة الاقتصادية

https://doi.org/10.31271/jopss.10070

ملخص

تتناول هذه الدراسة توزيع مسؤوليات الإنفاق في الدول الفدرالية، مع أخذ الاعتبارات الاقتصادية والدستورية له. ووفقًا لنظرية الفدرالية المالية، فإن الوظائف الاقتصادية للحكومات تضم تخصيص الموارد وتحقيق الاستقرار وإعادة التوزيع. ومع ذلك، من المهم النظر في الاعتبارات الدستورية أيضًا، اذ تعتمد الأنظمة الاتحادية على الدستور، ويؤثر توزيع السلطة بين مستويات الحكومة بمتغيرات سياسية وتاريخية. وبينما تعد الاعتبارات الاقتصادية ضرورية لتحقيق الكفاءة والمساواة، فإن الاعتبارات الدستورية مهمة لتحديد المسؤوليات الوظيفية وضمان توزيع السلطة بطريقة متوافقة مع مبادئ الفيدرالية. لذلك، تبدأ هذه الدراسة بالتساؤل عن أفضل تخصيص لمسؤوليات الإنفاق في ضوء الاعتبارات الاقتصادية والدستورية، وماهي وسائل للحل المشاكل التي تنشا في العلاقات المالية بين الحكومية. لذلك، نفترض أن الاعتبارات الاقتصادية وحدها لا تكفي في تصميم النظام المالي وخاصة في البلدان الفيدرالية. لأنها توضح لنا ما يجب القيام به نظريًا لتحقيق المساواة والكفاءة الاقتصادية، اما الاعتبارات الدستورية توضح لنا أنواع الدساتير من حيث تفاصيل توزيع الصلاحيات بشكل عام بما في ذلك الأمور المالية ويتناول المسؤوليات الوظيفية لكل من الحكومات المركزية والإقليمية. وفي بحثنا هذا، وصلنا الى انه لا يوجد مقاس واحد تناسب جميع الدول الفدرالية لتوزيع السلطات، اذ تشكل الدول الفدرالية في بيئات سياسية وتاريخية مختلفة، وطبيعة العلاقات المالية بين الحكومات تتغير باستمرار.

پوختە

ڕەچاوکراوە ئابووری و دەستورییەکانى تەرخانکردنی بەرپرسیارێتی خەرجکردن لە دەوڵەتە فیدراڵیەکاندا

ئەم توێژینەوەیە باس لە دیاریکردنی بەرپرسیارێتی خەرجکردن لە وڵاتانی فیدراڵیدا دەکات، بە ڕەچاوکردنی هەردوو لایەن ئابووری و دەستوریی. بەپێی تیۆری فیدرالیزمی دارایی ئەرکە ئابوورییەکانی حکومەتەکان بریتییە لە تەرخانکردنی سەرچاوەکان و سەقامگیری و دووبارە دابەشکردنەوە. بەڵام گرنگە ڕەچاوی لایەنی دەستوورییش بکرێت، چونکە سیستەمی فیدراڵی لەسەر بنەمای دەستوور دامەزراوە، دابەشکردنی دەسەڵات لەنێوان ئاستەکانی جیاوازەکانی حکومەتدا لەژێر کاریگەری گۆڕاوە سیاسی و مێژووییەکاندایە. لەکاتێکدا کە بواری ئابووری بۆ بەدەستهێنانی کارایی و یەکسانی زۆر گرنگە، بەڵام بواری دەستورییش بۆ دیاریکردنی ئەرک وبەرپرسیارێتیەکان ودابەشکردنی دەسەڵات کە لەگەڵ بنەماکانی فیدراڵیزمدا بگونجێت زۆر گرنگە. بۆیە ئەم توێژینەوەیە بە پرسیار کردن لە باشترین دیاریکردنی بەرپرسیارێتی خەرجییەکان لەژێر ڕۆشنایی لایەنی ئابووری و دەستووریدا دەستپێدەکات، وە چ شێوازێک دەتوانرێت بەکاربهێنرێت بۆ چارەسەرکردنی ئەو ناکۆکیانەی کە لە پەیوەندییە داراییەکانی حکومەتەکاندا سەرهەڵدەدەن. ئەم توێژینەوەیە گریمانەی ئەوە دەکات کە تەنیا بواری ئابووری بەس نییە بۆ داڕشتنی سیستەمی دارایی، بە تایبەت لە وڵاتانی فیدراڵیدا. لەکاتێکدا کە بواری ئابووری لە ڕووی تیۆریەوە گرنگی دەدات بەوەی کە پێویستە چی بکرێت بۆ بەدەستهێنانی یەکسانی و کارایی ئابووری، ئەوا بواری دەستووری جۆری دەستوورەکان لە ڕووی وردەکارییەکانی دابەشکردنی دەسەڵات بەگشتی و لەوانەش بابەتی دارایی و بەرپرسیارێتیەکان بۆ هەردوو حکومەتی فدرالی و هەرێمی ڕوون دەکاتەوە. لەکۆتاییدا ئەم توێژینەوەیە گەیشتە ئەو دەرئەنجامەی کە فۆڕمێکی دیریکراومان نیە بۆ دابەشکردنی دەسەڵاتەکان کە بۆ هەموو وڵاتانی فیدراڵی گونجاوبێت، چونکە دەوڵەتە فیدراڵیەکان لە ژینگەی سیاسی و مێژوویی جیاوازدا کاردەکەن، وە سروشتی پەیوەندییە داراییەکانی نێوان حکومەتەکان بەردەوام لە گۆڕاندایە.

Abstract

The Economic and Constitutional Considerations in Allocating Spending Responsibilities in Federal Countries

This study discusses the assignment of spending responsibilities in federal countries, taking into account both economic and constitutional considerations. According to the theory of fiscal federalism, the economic functions of governments contain resource allocation, stabilization, and redistribution. However, it is also important to consider constitutional considerations, as federal systems are based on constitutions and the distribution of power between government levels is influenced by political and historical variables. While economic considerations are vital for achieving efficiency and equity, constitutional considerations are crucial for determining functions and responsibilities and safeguarding the distribution of power consistent with federalism principles. Therefore, this study begins by questioning the best allocation of spending responsibilities in light of economic and constitutional considerations, and what methods can be used to solve conflicts that arise in government financial relationships. We assume that economic considerations alone are not enough to design the financial system, especially in federal countries. While they theoretically explain what needs to be done to achieve economic equity and efficiency, constitutional considerations explain the types of constitutions in terms of details of power distribution in general, including financial matters and functional responsibilities for both central and regional governments. We concluded that there is no one-size-fits-all approach for all federal countries to distribute powers, as federal states operate in different political and historical settings, and the nature of intergovernmental fiscal relations are constantly changing.

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